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The purpose of this thesis is to determine the extent to
which Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRA's) have been
established at Defense Contract Administration Services
Plant Representative Offices (DCASPRO's) and Naval Plant
Representative Offices (NAVPRO's). The research is also
intended to identify the reasons why FPRA's are not estab-
lished and determine what actions can be taken to increase
the number of this type of agreement. The major conclusion
is that Forward Pricing Rate Agreements covering the main
categories of labor and overhead rates have not been estab-
lished to the maximum extent possible at DCASPRO's and
NAVPRO's. The primary recommendation is to eliminate the
reguirement to use the Joint Logistics Commanders' (JLC)
uniform rates of change when determining forward pricing
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Forward pricing rates are rates and factors, such as
direct labor rates, various overhead rates, and cost-of-
money factors that are used by contractors in pricing
proposals for new procurement or modifications to existing
contracts. Contractors may formalize these rates with the
Government through a negotiated written agreement called a
Forward Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA) . FPRA's make the
rates and factors available for a specified period of time
and are particularly beneficial to those contractors who do
a large amount of pricing actions. Although FPRA's can be
very useful, there has been reluctance on the part of some
contractors to enter into these agreements. [Refs. l:p. 15-
2 6; 2: p.. 69]
B. OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the extent to
which Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRA's) have been
established at Defense Contract Administration Services
Plant Representative Offices (DCASPRO's) and Naval Plant
Representative Offices (NAVPRO's). The thesis is also
intended to identify the reasons why FPRA's are not
established and determine what actions can be taken to
increase the number of this type of agreement.
Specific objectives of the thesis are as follows:
1. Explain the FPRA process.
2. Determine the extent to which FPRA's have been
established at DCASPRO's and NAVPRO's and identify the
reasons why FPRA's are not entered into.
3. Identify the advantages and disadvantages of FPRA's.
4
.
Determine what actions can be taken to increase the
number of FPRA's.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is:
To what extent have Forward Pricing Rate Agreements
(FPRA's) been established at DCASPRO's and NAVPRO's?
Subsidiary research questions are:
1. What are the reasons (Government and contractor), that
FPRA's are not established?
2. To what extent and for what reasons are FPRA's
abrogated (canceled) by either party prior to the
expiration of the agreement?
3. What actions can be taken (Government, contractor and
statutory/regulatory) to increase the number of
FPRA's?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology employed in this thesis
included a comprehensive literature review and personal
interviews. The comprehensive literature review involved a
review of current periodicals, previous research reports,
Federal statutes, Federal procurement regulations and
manuals, Boards of Contract Appeals decisions, U.S. Court of
Claims decisions and decisions of the Comptroller General.
The reviews of the Boards of Contract Appeals decisions,
U.S. Court of Claims decisions and decisions of the
Comptroller General were conducted with the assistance of
Federal Legal Information Through Electronics (FLITE)
.
Personal interviews were conducted with DCASPRO, NAVPRO
and contractor personnel . Selected DCASPRO and NAVPRO
personnel were asked to respond to an 11 question survey.
The survey consisted of seven primary questions and four
subsidiary questions. A listing of these questions is
contained in the next section of this chapter.
The examination of FPRA's in this thesis was limited to
DCASPRO 's and NAVPRO ' s for two reasons. First, Plant
Representative Offices were chosen because these commands
would not have been established if the cognizant contractor
did not do a high volume of Department of Defense
contracting. Secondly, DCASPRO 's and NAVPRO ' s were selected
because of the probability that these activities will handle
some or all Navy contracts.
A sample of 2 DCASPRO 's (43 percent) and 8 NAVPRO' s (53
percent) of the present total population of 47 DCASPRO' s and
15 NAVPRO ' s was selected for the survey. The selection
process was not scientific; however, it was designed to
provide a representative sample of DCASPRO 's and NAVPRO' s.
Two DCASPRO 's were selected from each of the nine regions
with the exception of the St. Louis, New York and Los
Angeles regions. Due to the large number of PRO'S located
in the New York and Los Angeles regions three and four
PRO'S, respectively, were selected. The only PRO assigned
to the St. Louis region was selected. The eight NAVPRO's
were also selected based on geographic location. Two were
selected from the East Coast, three were selected from the
Midwest, and three were selected from the West Coast.
The survey questions were presented to Contract
Management Branch Chiefs, Financial Services Branch Chiefs,
Business Management Branch Chiefs, Corporate Administrative
Contracting Officers (CACO) , Divisional Administrative
Contracting Officers (DACO) and Cost Monitoring Coordinators
(CMC) . The interviews were conducted either at the Plant
Representative Office or via telephone. Each interview
lasted an average of 2 minutes.
E. SURVEY QUESTIONS
1. Primary Questions
The seven primary questions asked in the survey
1. Does your Plant Representative Office currently have
any Forward Pricing Rate Agreements?
2. Has your office had any FPRA's within the previous
five years (calendar years 1983-1987)?
3. What do you feel are the main advantages of FPRA's?
4. What do you feel are the main disadvantages of FPRA's?
5. What actions can be taken by DCASPRO ' s/NAVPRO ' s to
increase the number of FPRA's?
6. What actions can be taken by Government contractors to
increase the number of FPRA's?
7 . What statutory or regulatory changes could be made
that would lead to an increase in the number of
FPRA's?
2 . Subsidiary Questions
The four subsidiary questions asked were:
1. What is the time period of coverage for the
agreement ( s) ?--This question was asked of those
respondents who answered "Yes" to Question One.
2
.
What are the reasons for not having any agreements?
—
This question was asked of those respondents who
answered "No" to Question One.
3. Were any of the prior agreements abrogated and if so,
for what reason or reasons?—This question was asked
of those respondents who answered "Yes" to Question
Two.
4 What were the reason or reasons for not entering into
any FPRA • s?--This question was asked of those
respondents who answered "No" to Question Two.
F. ASSUMPTIONS AND SCOPE
1. Assumptions
The assumption made at the beginning of the thesis
process was that forward pricing rate agreements are a
useful contracting tool. It was also assumed that there has
been reluctance on the part of some contractors to enter
into these agreements.
Additionally, although only 4 3 percent of the
DCASPRO's and 53 percent of the NAVPRO • s were actually
surveyed it is assumed that the data gathered from these
activities accurately reflect the total population.
2 . Scope
The primary research question concerning
establishment of FPRA's at DCASPRO's and NAVPRO's largely
defined the scope of the thesis.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I
addresses the objective of the thesis and includes research
questions; research methodology; survey questions; scope and
assumptions; and organization of the study.
Chapter II provides background information and a general
description of the FPRA process.
Chapter III reports the results of the surveys that were
conducted with DCASPRO and NAVPRO personnel.
Chapter IV analyzes the results of the surveys as
reported in Chapter III.
Chapter V contains the researcher's conclusions derived
from data analysis as presented in Chapter IV. It also
includes recommendations for improving the FPRA process and
lists areas of possible future research on this topic.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter II will provide background information and a
general description of the FPRA process. Current
regulations and directives governing FPRA's (FAR, DFARS,
DLAM, ASPM) will be synopsized and pertinent protests and
appeals will be summarized. There is also discussion of
FPRA-related issues. The chapter will conclude with an
example of a typical forward pricing rate cycle and outline
the process and procedures required to establish an FPRA.
B. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR)
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) section 15.809
contains the current Federal regulations governing FPRA's.
The FAR defines a forward pricing rate agreement as [Ref. 1:
p. 15-26]:
...a written agreement negotiated between a contractor and
the Government to make certain rates available during a
specified period for use in pricing contracts or
modifications. Such rates represent reasonable
projections of specific costs that are not easily
estimated for, identified with, or generated by a specific
contract, contract end item, or task. These projections
may include rates for labor, indirect costs, material
obsolescence and usage, spare parts provisioning, and
material handling.
FPRA's "may be requested by the contracting officer or
contractor or initiated by the Administrative Contracting
Officer (ACO) " but "should be negotiated only with
contractors having a significant volume of government
contract proposals." The decision on establishment of an
FPRA rests with the cognizant contract administration
agency. In making the decision on FPRA's the ACO should
consider "whether the benefits to be derived from an
agreement are commensurate with the effort of establishing
and monitoring it." [Ref. l:p. 15-39]
The FAR lists three requirements that shall be addressed
in every FPRA.
1. An agreement is required to "provide specific terms
and conditions covering expiration, application, and
data requirements." The purpose of this is to allow
for "systematic monitoring" in order to "assure the
validity" of the forward pricing rates.
2. The FPRA must also provide for cancellation. A
cancellation may be done by either party.
3
.
The third item that must be addressed is the
requirement that any significant changes to the
contractor's cost or pricing data be submitted to the
ACO and cognizant contract auditor. This action
permits the rates to be properly monitored and allows
for adjustment or abrogation of the agreement. [Ref.
l:p. 15-39]
Establishment and usage of FPRA's require specific
actions on the part of ACO's, government contractors
(offerors) and contracting officers. The responsibilities
of each, as delineated in the FAR, are contained in the
following paragraphs.
1. Administrative Contracting Officer (ACQ)
It is the ACO's responsibility to obtain a
contractor's proposal. The proposal must contain current,
accurate, and complete cost and pricing data as of the date
of submission. The ACO then evaluates the proposal,
develops a Government objective and conducts negotiations
with the contractor. The ACO is required by FAR to invite
"the cognizant contract auditor and contracting offices
having a significant interest to participate" in the above
processes. The ACO "shall prepare a Price Negotiation
Memorandum (PNM) " upon completion of the negotiations. The
ACO must also forward copies of both the FPRA and PNM to
"all known contracting offices" that may be affected by the
FPRA and "to the cognizant auditor." [Ref. l:p. 15-39]
A certificate of current cost or pricing data is not
required at the time of establishment of the FPRA. [Ref. 1:
p. 15-39]. If the FPRA is used to support a later
contractual action that requires a certificate of current
cost or pricing data, the certificate shall cover the
following [Ref. l:p. 15-30]:
...(1)' the data originally supplied to support the
forward pricing rate agreement or other advance agreement
and (2) all data required to update the price proposal to
the time of agreement on contract price.
The ACO is also responsible for determining whether
or not changed conditions have invalidated all or part of
the FPRA. If the agreement is determined to be invalid by
the ACO due to changed conditions, the ACO "shall notify all
interested parties of the extent of its effect and initiate
revision of the agreement." When invalidated "the
contractor, ACO, and contracting officer shall reflect the
changed condition in proposals, cost analyses, and





The FAR prescribes two requirements for government
contractors. Contractors, termed "offerors" in the FAR, are
required to: (1) "describe any FPRA's in each specific
pricing proposal to which the rates apply" and (2)
"identify the latest cost or pricing data already submitted
in accordance with the agreement." [Ref. l:p. 15-39]
3 Contracting Officer
In accordance with FAR, a contracting officer will
"use FPRA rates as bases for pricing all contracts,
modifications, and other contractual actions" that will be
"performed during the period covered by the agreement." The
only exception to this requirement occurs when "the ACO
determines that changed conditions have invalidated part or
all of the agreement." The contracting officer is also
required to promptly report to the ACO any condition that
may effect the FPRA's validity. [Ref. l:p. 15-39]
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FAR SUPPLEMENT (DFARS)
The Department of Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS)
,
section 15.8 09, provides additional Department of Defense
requirements concerning FPRA's. The section focuses
primarily on changed conditions. Subsection 15.809 (e) (2)
provides the following list of items that the Department of
Defense (DOD) requires an ACO to consider in assessing
changed conditions [Ref. 3:p. 15.8-14]:
(i) the type of contract contemplated; (ii) whether the
dollar amount of the proposed contract action would
significantly change the rates in the agreement; (iii)
whether the performance period of the proposed contract
action is significantly different from the period to which
the rate agreement applies; and (iv) any new data or other
information that may raise a question as to the
acceptability of the rates.
The DFARS also states that contracting representatives
should not delay individual contracting actions when changed
conditions negate FPRA's. [Ref. 3:p. 15.8-14]
D. DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY MANUAL 8105.1 (DLAM 8105.1)
The Defense Logistics Agency's Contract Administration
Manual for Contract Administration Services (DLAM 8105.1)
specifically defines the procedures for establishing FPRA's.
DCASPRO's are required to follow these procedures.
As stated in Section II.B.l. above, the first step in
this process is the ACO's request for, and contractor's
submission of, an FPRA proposal. The request should be
timely enough to allow for contractor preparation,
Government review and negotiations prior to the beginning of
the period that the FPRA is intended to cover. The ACO
should normally request the contractor's proposal at least
six months prior to the beginning of the applicable period.
[Ref. 2:p. 69]
The proposal, which should normally cover all fiscal
periods for which the rates and factors will be required,
should be thorough enough to support the following 19 budget
estimates [Ref. 2:pp. 69,70]:
1. Projections or assumptions supporting the sales
forecast (including identification of potential
buyers, e.g. , specific Government buying activities,
foreign military sales and commercial sales)
.
2. Planned production scheduling, planned engineering
projects, projected material usage, and product
delivery assumptions.
3. Projected major indirect expenses which make up the
proposed overhead expense pool or cost center
expenditures.
4. Projected base(s) used to allocate the indirect costs.
5. Major planned capital expenditures including plant
expansion.
6. Pending corporate structure changes, i.e., mergers or
divestitures
.
7. Changes or inconsistencies with previously disclosed
methods of allocating costs to the overhead pools or
cost centers.
8. Plant or equipment renovation plans.
9. Plans for disposition of idle facilities or idle
capacity.
10. Increases in direct and indirect labor rates.
11. Anticipated changes in fringe benefits.
12
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Impact on labor costs resulting from changes in labor
skill mix.
13. Equivalent number of employees expected to be charged
to overhead, forecast by time period, function and
location.
14 Equivalent number of employees expected to be charged
direct to contracts, forecast by time period,
function, and location.
15. Planned efficiencies which affect costs.
16. Economic factors and conditions that are reasonably
expected to exist at specified future periods.
17. Pricing factors used for travel, material handling,
spoilage, etc.
18. Ratio of indirect labor costs to direct labor costs.
19. Any specific item, area, or function within the
proposal that the ACO determines should be explained
or expanded.
The next procedure involves the government ' s review of
the contractor's FPRA proposal. This review will consist of
pricing, technical and audit evaluations. The pricing
report will be conducted by the Cost Monitoring Coordinator
(CMC) or price analyst upon request by the ACO and will
include the technical and audit reports. The pricing report
will focus on inefficiencies or unallowable costs and
comment on the validity of the contractor's projected sales
volume. Estimates of Independent Research and Development
(IR&D) and Bid and Proposal (B&P) costs will also be
obtained' and reviewed. The technical review will examine
the contractor's anticipated labor and material requirements
for the period covered by the FPRA. [Ref. 2: p. 70]
The third step in establishing an FPRA involves the
negotiations between government and contractor
representatives. As stated previously, procuring activities
having significant business with the contractor will be
invited, in writing, by the ACO to participate in the
negotiation of the agreement. [Ref. 2:p. 70]
When an agreement is reached on forward pricing rates it
will be formalized in a written document and executed by the
contractor and ACO. An FPRA negotiation memorandum
describing the pertinent events and considerations will be
drafted by the ACO to support the agreement. A copy of this
memorandum and the proposed FPRA are then forwarded to the
cognizant Defense Contract Administration Services Region
(DCASR) for review of "reasonableness and propriety" by the
DCASR review board. [Ref. 2: pp. 70,71]
The final step in the process involves furnishing a copy
of the executed FPRA to all negotiation participants and
Procurement Contracting Officers (PCO's) having repetitive
business with the contractor. [Ref. 2:p. 71]
E. ARMED SERVICES PRICING MANUAL (ASPM)
The Armed Services Pricing Manual (ASPM) comments
briefly on FPRA's. Under the section on interim pricing,
the manual addresses forward pricing factors. It classifies
these factors, along with overhead rates, as administrative
pricing actions. The ASPM lists certain considerations that
ACO's should consider in their decision to use or not use
FPRA's. Those considerations are as follows:
1. What is the volume of pricing actions?
2. Are all government agencies doing significant business
with the government in agreement on the rates?
3. Is the period of the agreement "long enough to justify
the administrative effort but not so long as to create
an unacceptable risk?"
4. What will "the nature, type and diversity of
operations and product mix bear on the terms of the
agreement?"
5. What is the reliability of cost accounting data and
cost estimating procedures? [Ref. 4:pp. 10-9,10-10]
The manual then highlights particular items an ACO
should watch for while monitoring the agreement such as:
(1) "changes in business volume," (2) "changes in market
conditions affecting material or labor costs," (3) "savings
accruing from cost reduction programs," and (4) "changes in




A search of unpublished Decisions of the Comptroller
General covering the period of January 1955 through March
1987 conducted by Federal Legal Information Through
Electronics (FLITE) identified two protests that were
directly related to forward pricing rate agreements. The
two protests were against the same contract award.
2. Protests B-219428, B-219440
a. Overview
The protests (B-219428, B-219440, October 17,
1985, 85-2 CPD 416), centered on the Naval Sea Systems
Command's (NAVSEA) proposed award of a contract based on
evaluation of costs through the use of current audited
forward pricing rates from existing agreements vice through
15
the use of a Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audit of
proposed costs. The two protests were handled as one by the
General Accounting Office (GAO)
.
b. Background
On March 26, 1985 NAVSEA issued a Request For
Proposals (RFP) No. N00024-85-R-8511 for the Atlantic Fleet
AE-class phased maintenance program. The solicitation was a
total small business set aside geographically restricted to
the Earle, New Jersey homeport area. The RFP called for an
award fee contract and stated that each proposal would be
evaluated on (listed in descending order of importance)
,
management capability, cost, technical approach and resource
availability. NAVSEA also stated in the solicitation that
the Government reserved the right to award on the basis of
initial proposals without holding discussions. [Ref. 5]
Four ship repair facilities submitted proposals
in response to the RFP. NAVSEA initially asked DCAA to
prepare an audit report on the cost portion of the four
proposals but subsequently canceled the request when it was
discovered that relevant rate information was available from
the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair,
United States Navy, Brooklyn (SUPSHIP Brooklyn) . SUPSHIP
Brooklyn provided NAVSEA with each contractor's current
audited forward pricing rates and these rates were then used
in the proposal evaluations to determine the "cost to the
Government". [Ref. 5]
After weights were assigned to each evaluation
category, Coastal Dry Dock and Repair Corporation (COASTAL)
received the highest number of points in each of the
technical categories and the highest number of points
overall. COASTAL was not the lowest cost offeror however,
their cost was determined to be fair and reasonable. [Ref.
5]
COASTAL, based on their "overall highest score,
superior technical scores and reasonable valuated projected
cost," was recommended to the source selection authority by
the PCO for selection as the successful offeror. No
discussions were held with the three other offerors. On
June 28, 1985 the unsuccessful offerors were notified of the
proposed award to COASTAL. Hoboken Shipyards, Inc.
(Hoboken) and Perth Amboy Dry Dock Company (Perth Amboy)
then filed individual protests with GAO. [Ref. 5]
c. Protested Items
The following eight items were protested by
Perth Amboy and/or Hoboken:
1. Combination of three overhauls in one contract.
2
.
DCAA audits were not completed nor considered in the
cost analysis.
3. Award of the contract without full consideration of
the cost realism reguirements.
4. Award without discussions.
5. Insufficient time allowed for cost evaluation.
6. Bias in evaluation.
17
7. Qualifications of proposed awardee to perform the
contract.
8. Recovery of proposal preparation and protest costs.
All protests were either dismissed or denied by GAO. [Ref.
5]
d. GAO's Decisions
The use of forward pricing rates was a major
issue in two of the protested items listed in Section
II.F.2.b. above. Concerning item (2) (DCAA audits were not
completed nor considered in the cost analysis) , GAO found
that
...neither protester has shown that the contracting
officer's decision to use forward pricing rates... to
assist in determining 'cost to the Government' was clearly
erroneous, and we find nothing improper in this approach.
[Ref. 5]
The findings on item (3) (Award of the contract
without full consideration of the cost realism
requirements), are a clear indication of GAO's support for
the use of current, audited forward pricing rates in
proposal cost evaluations. The following statements were
extracted from GAO's decision on this protested item [Ref.
5]:
1. It was reasonable for the Navy to use forward pricing
data provided by SUPSHIP Brooklyn to formulate labor
rates and overhead rates as elements in the "cost to
the Government" evaluation factor score.
2. DOD FAR SUPP 15 . 805 (A) (1) (V) , supra, authorizes the
use of current forward pricing rate agreements in
formulating Government cost estimates.
3.
Evaluated costs rather than proposed costs provide a
sounder basis for determining the most advantageous
cost proposal.
4. We (GAO) find no impropriety in the Navy's use of
current audited forward pricing rates for each
contractor— in lieu of the labor and overhead rates
that DCAA audits would have provided—as an element in
the source selections plan's formula for determining
"cost to the Government."
5. Since the solicitation did not require DCAA audits nor
preclude the use of cost data available outside of the
proposal in formulating the "cost to the Government"
evaluation factor, we found that the Navy's
development of independent "cost to the Government"
estimates using current audited forward pricing rates
was within the discretion permitted a contracting
agency in evaluation cost factors.
3 . Requests for Reconsideration
Hoboken and Perth Amboy both filed a Request for
Reconsideration with GAO concerning GAO's decisions on their
protests. The requests (B-219428.2, B-219440.2, November
21, 1985, 85-2 CPD 582), again asserted that the rates in
the FPRA's obtained from SUPSHIP Brooklyn were not relevant
and NAVSEA's use of those rates in cost evaluation of the
offeror's proposals "constituted prejudicial error." [Ref.
5]
It was GAO's finding that the protesters raised no
new facts or legal arguments that were not considered during
the original protests and that the requests for
reconsideration merely indicated dissatisfaction with GAO's




A FLITE search of Boards of Contract Appeals
decisions covering the period from July 1956 through October
1986 found six appeals that made mention of FPRA's. Of
those six appeals, only one actually concerned forward
pricing rate agreements; Dillingham Shipyard ABSCA NO.





Dillingham Shipyard (DSY) filed a timely appeal
on the denial of their claim that incurred legal expenses
for defective pricing claims on three prior vessel repair
contracts should be included as allowable G&A expenditures
in forward pricing rate agreements. The appeal related to a
contracting officer's "final decision," (dated June 8,
1982) , which disallowed inclusion of the legal fees for the
defective pricing claims based on DCAA's audit report
conclusion that since the expenses were incurred on three
previously completed contracts, future Government contracts
should not have to bear the costs. Dillingham, on the other
hand, argued that the expenses should be allocated to their
long term Master Ship Repair (MSR) contract and desired to
have the legal costs added to their G&A pool. [Ref. 6: pp.
84605-84607]
Dillingham filed a claim with the contracting
officer after DSY and the Navy reached an agreement on
forward pricing rates on September 4, 1981 that did not
include the $.10 per hour factor to cover the legal fees.
The contracting officer denied the request for the
additional $.10 per hour. DSY then appealed the contracting
officer's "final decision" to the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (ASBCA) . [Ref. 6:pp. 84605-84607]
The Navy argued five points in requesting
dismissal of the appeal:
1. "Appellant (DSY) has failed to file a proper claim."
2. "Appellant's 'claim' is not related to the contract."
3. "The board is without jurisdiction to provide the
relief requested."
4. "Appellant's 'claim' was not properly submitted to the
contracting officer."
5. "The contracting officer did not render a decision on
the claims as enunciated in the complaint." [Ref. 6:
p. 84608]
Discussion of the Navy's positions listed above
will be limited to points (1) and (2) since they are the
items pertinent to this thesis.
In their arguments before the ASBCA the Navy
asserted that a forward pricing rate agreement is not a
contract but [Ref. 6:p. 84609]:
merely a negotiating tool generated for the
administrative convenience of the parties. It binds the
parties to nothing. They retain the right to contract at
that rate or not to contract at that rate at some time in
the future. The agreement does not obligate the
Government to award future contracts. Nor does it bind
the contractor to the performance of the future contracts.
It was also argued than an FPRA fails to meet
the definition of a "cognizable contract" as defined in
section 602 of the Contract Disputes Act. Therefore, if
there is not a contract upon which to file a claim, there
can be no "claim" and the contracting officer thus had no
authority to render a "final decision." The Government also
stated that DSY was merely attempting to "increase its pre-
negotiation position for future job orders" but is not
entitled to such a position as "a matter of right." [Ref.
6:pp. 84608,84609]
The Board agreed with the Navy's assertion that
an FPRA is not a contract but a "negotiation tool used at
the option of and for the convenience of the parties."
However, the Board stated that the fact that an FPRA is not
a contract does not resolve whether or not DSY filed a
proper claim. The Board commented that the FPRA was an
integral element in pricing job orders under the MSR
contract, whether the rate was used to price the order or
merely as a point to begin negotiations. The Board found
that since both parties had elected to use the FPRA as a
method of arriving at a price for work performed by
Dillingham under the Master Ship Repair contract, arguing
that there is an "insufficient nexus between the FPR




The Board concluded that DSY's claim did relate
to its contracts and as such constitutes a claim under the
Contract Disputes Act. It should also be noted that the
Board did not hold that DSY was entitled to the $.10 per
hour for legal fees. The Board also did not hold that they
had "any jurisdiction or authority to order the government
to include in an FPRA any specific element or any element
for legal fees."
The Board did, however, deny the Navy's motion
to dismiss based on the finding that DSY's submittal did
constitute a claim under the Contract Disputes Act. [Ref.
6:p. 84613]
H. RELATED ISSUES
1 . Joint Logistics Commander's (JLC) Uniform rates of
Change
The JLC rates of change of 2.5% for 1987, 3.5% for
1988 and 3.5% for 1989 were established by the Joint
Logistics Commanders during their 18 June 1987 meeting. The
rates of change are for use in the pricing of executive
compensation, salaries, wages, and employee benefits. Their
purpose is "to be management objectives which provide
sufficient motivation to contracting offices to negotiate
reasonable cost in establishing contract prices." [Ref. 7]
The policy on the use of JLC rates for DCASPRO's is
contained in paragraph 3 of Reference 8:
For evaluating contractor proposed forecasted labor rates,
including increases to executive compensation, salaries,
wage, and employee benefits, it is the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) policy to use the lower of either the Data
Resources, Inc., (DRI) forecast for Average Hourly
Earnings of Production Workers-Private Non-farm or the
uniform rates of change recommended by the Joint Logistics
Commanders (JLC's).
The JLC uniform rates of change are currently lower than DRI
forecasts.
The requirement for the NAVPRO's to use the JLC
rates is contained in Reference 7:
Accordingly, Navy contracting officials must continue with
efforts previously initiated to negotiate reasonable rates
of increase. The pricing of increases to executive
compensation, salaries, wages, and employee benefits
should not exceed the established rates without adequate
justification. Any increases above these recommended
management objectives (JLC uniform rates of change) must
be sufficiently supported and documented. This rationale
and support shall be reviewed and approved by top
management in each Command. .. .This position clearly
recognizes previously initiated efforts and the
established goals within the Government and the current
mandate of the Congress to reduce and control DOD
spending.
2 . Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
DCAA is a major player in the FPRA proposal review
process. It's contribution "is constituted as an advisory
report concerning a contractor's financial and accounting
policies, practices and experience." [Ref. 2: p. 47] DCAA
performs reviews and cost analyses requiring access to a
contractor's books and financial records. [Ref. 2:p. 50]
DCAA can be extremely helpful in establishing an
FPRA. However, it can also be a hindrance to the process.
Personalities and the professional relationship between the
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ACO and the auditor are the two main factors which influence
whether the auditor is viewed a help or a hindrance. If an
auditor takes the approach that the FPRA audit report is
"set in concrete" it may become difficult for an ACO to
negotiate an agreement. It becomes a case of the Government
fighting the Government.
One problem concerning DCAA that was mentioned by
several survey respondents was that DCAA uses DRI factors
for labor escalation vice the JLC uniform rates of change.
DCAA's status as an independent audit agency permits it to
use DRI in it's evaluations. A problem arises when its
recommendations concerning FPRA labor rates support the
contractor's position vice the ACO's position.
3 . Forward Pricing Rate Recommendation (FPRR)
Forward Pricing Rate Recommendations (FPRR) are
established for administrative convenience when there is a
significant number of pricing actions but the contractor is
not willing to enter into an FPRA. [Ref. 2:p. 71] The FPRR
is a unilateral determination of the rates by the ACO. The
rate determination is based on the results of the FPRA
proposal review and represent what the ACO feels are fair
and reasonable rates. FPRR's are extremely useful when a
contractor's rates change frequently. It requires less time
and effort to issue an FPRR than it does to establish an
FPRA.
FPRR's can simplify contract proposal reviews at the
buying commands but these recommended rates may not simplify
negotiations. A contractor who is not willing to enter into
an FPRA will probably not be willing to use the same
Government recommended rates on individual contracts.
It might be to a contractor's advantage to have
FPRR's because it is then possible for the contractor to
"play one PCO against another." If concessions can be
obtained on certain rates from one PCO the contractor can
then use these higher rates as a negotiating position when
negotiating with other PCO's.
4. Should Cost Review
The purpose of a should cost review is to identify
what it should cost to perform work if a "contractor is
reasonably efficient and economical in his methods of
operation." The review is intended to "identify
unecomonical or inefficient practices in the contractor's
management or operations" and "lead to both short- and long-
range improvements in the contractor's economy and
efficiency." It is not the purpose of a should cost review
to tell contractors how to conduct their business. [Refs.
l:p. 15-39; 2:p. 73]
The reviews are conducted by a formal team of
specialists to "evaluate a contractor's cost projections,
supporting standards, and other in-plant management,
operational and performance practices on which cost
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projections are based." It is a single coordinated effort
that merges the review actions of contracting, contract
administration, pricing, technical input and audit
personnel. [Ref. 2:p. 73]
A should cost review is an extremely productive
method for conducting FPRA proposal reviews. It provides
the ACO with a thorough examination of a contractors
accounting and cost estimating systems. The in-depth
knowledge of a contractor's business practices provided by a
should cost review enables the ACO to establish FPRA rates
that are both fair and reasonable.
5 . Defective Pricing
Defective pricing results when a final negotiated
contract price based on inaccurate, incomplete or non-
current cost or pricing data is agreed upon by the
Government and a prime contractor.
In 1962 Congress enacted Public Law (P.L.) 87-653,
the Truth-in-Negotiations Act, as an attempt to place
Government procurement officials on an "even footing" with
contractors during contract negotiations. Section 2306(f)
of this law established the requirement for contractors,
under certain circumstances, to submit and certify cost or
pricing data. The Act also provided for contract adjustment
if the data that were submitted were found to be inaccurate,
incomplete or noncurrent. Requirements for submitting
certified cost or pricing data are contained in Far section
15.804-2. [Ref. 9:pp. 810-811]
When FPRA rates are used in support of a later
contractual action which requires certification, the price
proposal certificate should cover the data originally
supplied to support the FPRA and all data required to update
the price proposal to the time of contract price agreement.
Certification for data used to support an FPRA "shall not"
be required at the time the FPRA is executed. [Ref. l:p.
15-30]
Forward pricing rates are normally based on
projected future costs, therefore defective pricing is
normally not a problem with FPRA's. However, defective
pricing issues do arise when the data that were provided to
project the rates were inaccurate, incomplete or noncurrent.
I. THE FORWARD PRICING RATE AGREEMENT (FPRA) CYCLE
1. Introduction
The process by which forward pricing rates are
initially developed by a contractor and then proposed to and
negotiated with the Government is extremely complex. It
requires a considerable amount of time and effort on the
part of both parties.
Figure 1, discussed below, is an example of a
forward pricing rate cycle for one division of a Government
contractor. The division is a third tier member of the






































































































































































































































































in turn reports to the first tier corporate headquarters.
It would be typical for a division of this size to have a
Plant Representative Office on-site. Figure 1 outlines the
various steps and associated timeperiods that are required
to achieve an FPRA.
2. The Forward Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA) Cycle
As is shown in Figure 1, the FPRA cycle begins
approximately 18 months prior to the effective date of the
agreement. A brief outline of each of the different steps
that occur during this 18 months is contained in the
following paragraphs.
a. Strategic Plan
The strategic plan is the first step in the
cycle. It is an attempt by the top management personnel
within the division to identify and evaluate what market
areas will be available during the next ten years and
determine at what level the division will be able to
participate in those markets. This market evaluation is
used to establish a strategy for investment of capital and
resources. Management examines where to focus research and
development efforts and tries to determine what particular
skill levels need to be improved in order for the division
to become competitive in targeted markets. The manager's
decisions are then formulated into the division's strategic
plan. The plan takes approximately four months to produce
and a new plan is generated each year.
b. Financial Plan
The financial plan, also developed at the
division level, is a zero based budgeting approach to
projected future business. The plan normally covers the
next three fiscal years with its primary focus on the
upcoming fiscal year. The period of coverage of an FPRA is
dependent upon the period of coverage of the financial plan.
Preparation of the financial plan normally requires about
three months and is done annually.
c. Group/Corporate Management Reviews
The third step in the FPRA cycle is a group and
corporate headquarters review of both the strategic and
financial plans. The review focuses mainly on the financial
plan. It is conducted first at the group level and then,
after being combined with the plans from the other divisions
within the group, is forwarded onto corporate headquarters
for final management review and approval . The review
process covers a two month period.
d. Division Level Budget
The division level budget is a three step
process. First, budget preparation begins while the
strategic and financial plans are under headquarters'
management review. The budget is specific, addressing items
such as the number of jobs, number of hours and costs based
on projected sales for the coming fiscal year. This is
followed by a local management review of the budget. After
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local management approval, the budget is published. The
combination of these three steps requires approximately
three months of effort.
e. Forward Pricing Rate Preparation
Concurrent with the division level budget
preparation forward pricing rates are also being prepared.
During this time the data used for budget preparation are
being flowed down into the forward pricing rates. Upon
publication of the budget the final budget figures are
incorporated into forward pricing rates and these rates are
then proposed to the Plant Representative Office (PRO) . The
optimum time for this event to occur is six months prior to
the expected effective date of the rates.
The period of coverage for forward pricing rates
varies normally from one to five years depending on the
contractor and the length of contracts. FPRA's covering
more than one year are normally renegotiated annually.
f. DCAA Rate Review
The proposal is then forwarded by the PRO to
DCAA for a rate review and corresponding audit report. Two
months are allotted to DCAA to conduct their review.
g. Plant Representative Office Review
After receipt of the audit report from DCAA, the
PRO commences its review. The review is conducted by the
ACO. It consists of an evaluation of the contractor's
proposal against Government generated pricing, technical and
audit evaluations. Based on this review the ACO generates a
negotiation position. The Government's review of the
proposal takes approximately one month.
h. Negotiation and Agreement
Upon completion of the review at the PRO, both
Government and contractor representatives enter into
negotiations to establish a formal forward pricing rate
agreement. When a negotiated settlement is achieved, the
forward pricing rate agreement is drafted and executed by
both parties. The optimal time for this to occur is
approximately 3 days prior to the end of the contractor's
fiscal year. This will allow time for the agreement to be
reviewed, published and distributed prior to the effective
date of the rates. Negotiations require about two months to
complete.
i. Monthly Tracking Analyses
The forward pricing rates are tracked
continually by both the Government and the contractor. The
analyses consist primarily of comparing actual expenditures
against budgeted expenditures for each individual overhead
cost element. In addition, actual cost inputs are compared
to proposed cost inputs. When the difference in an
expenditure or cost input would have a material effect on
overhead rates, a variance analysis is conducted in order to
determine the reason for the difference. [Ref. 2:p. 71]
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DLAM 8105.1 establishes a requirement for an in
depth government analysis of variances when "baseline
targets and actual expenditures are out of tolerance by both
three percent and $100,000 (plus or minus)." [Ref. 2:p. 72]
j . Contractor/Plant Representative Office Reviews
The results of the tracking analyses are
reviewed monthly by the contractor and the PRO. The purpose
of these reviews is to determine if amendment or
cancellation of the FPRA is required.
3 . Conclusion
The FPRA cycle provided in Figure 1 is based on an
ideal system. In reality the time allotted for the various
steps is frequently exceeded and the FPRA's are not
negotiated prior to the beginning of the contractor's new
fiscal year. When this occurs, the FPRA becomes effective
upon the date it is executed. On occasion, and at the
concurrence of both parties, outstanding proposals submitted
during the current fiscal year but prior to the date of the
agreement are repriced using the FPRA rates.
J. SUMMARY
Chapter II provided background information concerning
FPRA's. The chapter contained an examination of current
laws and regulations governing FPRA's, reviewed pertinent
appeals and protests and addressed other issues related to
these agreements. The final section of the chapter
35
presented an example of a typical forward pricing rate
cycle.
As was shown in this chapter, the FPRA process is
lengthy and complex. A concentrated effort is required by
both the Government and the contractor in order to
successfully execute an agreement. Chapter III will present
data that were derived from the survey of the DCASPRO • s and
NAVPRO's. The success that DCASPRO' s and NAVPRO's have had
in establishing agreements will be shown in Chapter III.
In addition to examining current and past usage of FPRA's,
data will also be provided concerning advantages and
disadvantages of the agreements and what actions can be
taken to increase the number of FPRA's.
III. SURVEY RESULTS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will present the results of the telephone
surveys that were conducted with the 2 DCASPRO's and eight
NAVPRO ' s
.
The respondents were each asked seven main questions and
two of four subsidiary questions. The answers given for
questions one and two determined which two subsidiary
questions would be asked. The survey was designed to cover
the following three areas: (1) the level of current and
past usage of FPRA's by each command, (2) the advantages and
disadvantages of FPRA's, and (3) what actions can be taken
(Government, industry and statutory/regulatory) , to increase
the number of FPRA's. An analysis of the data provided in
this chapter will be contained in Chapter IV.
B. RESPONSES
1 . Overview
There are a multitude of rates that can be covered
by a forward pricing rate agreement. One DCASPRO, for
example, has agreements covering a total of 129 rates that
are in use at six different plant locations. For the
purpose of simplification the different rates were grouped
into three areas; labor rates, overhead rates and other
factors. Other factors are rates such as cost-of-money,
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common minor material, special test equipment, travel
allowances, etc.
Some DCASPRO's and NAVPRO's are responsible for more
than one division or plant location of the company under
their cognizance. For those PRO's responsible for more than
one division or plant location a separate FPRA is normally
established for each. The survey results do not
differentiate FPRA usage between the different divisions or
plant locations. The data focus only on whether or not an
FPRA of any type for any division or location is currently
in effect at the DCASPRO or NAVPRO.
FPRA's can be constructed in several different ways.
Some activities have one agreement that covers all rates,
some have a different agreement for each rate and others
group rates together by category or program (e.g., a major
weapon system contract) and negotiate an FPRA covering each
group. The most common method is to establish a single
agreement covering all rates.
2 . Question One
Question one was, "Does your Plant Representative
Office currently have any Forward Pricing Rate Agreements?"
a. DCASPRO
Of the 20 DCASPRO's that were surveyed, ten (50
percent) currently have FPRA's of some type. Eight
DCASPRO's (40 percent) have FPRA's covering the major
categories of labor and overhead. Of these eight, seven
have agreements which also include other factors. One
DCASPRO (five percent) has an FPRA that covers overhead
rates. The agreement does not cover labor rates but does
include other factors. One DCASPRO (five percent) has an
FPRA that is limited to other factors only. Ten DCASPRO's




Labor & Overhead (40%)
Figure 2. DCASPRO FPRA Usage
Four of the ten DCASPRO's that do not have
current agreements are presently reviewing FPRA proposals.
Of the four, three are optimistic that they will be able to
negotiate some type of FPRA. If all three are successful in
establishing an agreement it would increase the percentage
of DCASPRO's with current FPRA's from 50 to 65 percent. In
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addition, the DCASPRO with the agreement that covers only
other factors is reviewing an FPRA proposal on labor and
overhead rates. The DCASPRO is optimistic that it will be
able to expand its current agreement to encompass these two




Of the eight NAVPRO' s that were surveyed, five
(63 percent) currently have FPRA's of some type. Two
NAVPRO' s (25 percent) have FPRA's covering the major
categories of labor and overhead. Both agreements also
include other factors. One NAVPRO (12 percent) has an FPRA
that covers overhead rates. The agreement does not cover
labor rates but does include other factors. Two NAVPRO 's
(25 percent) have FPRA's that are limited to other factors
only. Three NAVPRO 's (38 percent) do not currently have any
FPRA's. There are no NAVPRO 's that have FPRA proposals
under review. See Figure 3.
c. Combined Survey Results
The combined survey results of DCASPRO 's and
NAVPRO 's are as follows (See Figure 4):
1. Ten (36 percent) of the 28 activities have current
FPRA's covering the major categories of labor and
overhead.
2. Two (seven percent) of the 28 activities have current
FPRA's covering overhead rates.
3. Three (11 percent) of the 28 activities have current
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Figure 4. Combined DCASPRO and NAVPRO FPRA Usage
4. Thirteen (46 percent) of the 28 activities have no
current FPRA's.
Five activities have FPRA proposals of some type
under review. Four are reviewing proposals to reestablish
expired agreements and one is reviewing a proposal to add
labor and overhead rates to its current agreement that
covers other factors. Three of the four commands reviewing
reestablishment proposals and the one reviewing the
expansion proposal are all optimistic that they will be able
to negotiate an agreement. If the four PRO ' s are
successful, the combined number of DCASPRO's and NAVPRO
s
surveyed that possess FPRA's would rise from 54 to 64
percent. However, commands with agreements covering the
major categories of labor and overhead would only rise from
36 to 50 percent.
The 15 commands that responded "Yes" to Question
One were asked the subsidiary guestion: "What is the time
period of coverage for the agreement (s) ?"
The length of the FPRA's that are currently in
effect at the DCASPRO's and NAVPRO 's range from one to six
years. The most common lengths are annual, three year and
five year. It should be noted that the FAR does not mandate
that FPRA's cover a specified amount of time.
A breakdown of the periods of coverage for the
15 Plant Representative Offices with current FPRA's is
contained in Table 1.
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The FPRA's that cover a period greater than one
year are normally updated annually in order to ensure that
the rates covered by the agreement remain current. However,
an agreement may be revised more often, if reguired, due to
a change in conditions affecting the rates.
The 13 commands that answered "No" to Question
One were asked the subsidiary guestion, "What are the
reasons for not having any agreements?"
There were seven primary reasons given why the
13 activities were unable to negotiate any type of FPRA.
The reasons expressed were as follows:
1. Structural reorganization within the company—three of
13 (23 percent)
.
2. Reluctance/lack of interest on the part of the
contractor—two of 13 (15 percent)
.
3. Sale or pending sale of the company—two of 13 (15
percent)
.
4. Inadequate accounting system and/or cost estimating
system—two of 13 (15 percent)
.
5. Contract type--All or primarily all of the
contractor's contracts are Firm-Fixed Price (FFP) —two
of 13 (15 percent)
.
6. Frequent rate changes—one of 13 (8 percent)
.
7. Currently negotiating a new agreement. The previous
FPRA has expired—one of 13 (8 percent)
.
3. Question Two
Question two was, "Has your office had any FPRA's
within the previous five years (calendar years 1983-1987)?"
Twenty-three of the 2 8 Plant Representative Offices
surveyed (82 percent) indicated that their office had
negotiated FPRA's of some type within the past five years.
Four of these 2 3 activities were unable to provide data on
more than the previous two years but all four did state that
their command has executed at least one FPRA within the past
two years. A breakdown of historical FPRA usage by all 28
activities according to the number of years that an FPRA was
in effect between 1983 and 1987 follows. See Figure 5.
1. Five years out of five—eight PRO'S (4 DCAS, 4 NAV) —
29 percent.
2. Four years out of five—four PRO'S (4 DCAS) — 14
percent.
3. Three years out of five—two PRO's (2 DCAS) —
7
percent.
4. Two years out of five—two PRO's (1 DCAS, 1 NAV) —
percent.
5. One year out of five—three PRO's (1 DCAS, 2 NAV) —11
percent.
ID*
FPRA Coverage (# of prior years)
* Note: ID = Insufficient Data (Data For Past 2 Years Only)
Figure 5. Historical FPRA Usage (Five Year)
6. None—no FPRA s within past five years— five PRO'S (5
DCAS) — 18 percent.
7. Insufficient data— four PRO'S (3 DCAS, 1 NAV) — 14
percent.
The 2 3 commands that responded "Yes" to Question Two
were asked the subsidiary question: "Were any of the prior
agreements abrogated and if so, for what reason or reasons?"
Of the 23 activities that had FPRA's during the past
five years, 16 (70 percent) stated that at least one
agreement had been abrogated. The overwhelming reason given
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for why the agreements were canceled was "the overrunning or
underrunning of the negotiated rates." This reason was
cited by 14 of the 16 respondents as being at least one of
the reasons for abrogation. Two other reasons indicated
were "Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) issues" and the
"development of a poor business relationship between the
contractor and the Government." The other seven PRO'S did
not have any of their prior agreements abrogated.
The five commands that responded "No" to Question
Two were asked the subsidiary question: "What were the
reason or reasons for not entering into any FPRA's?"
Each of the five commands is one of the 13
activities that presently do not have any type of FPRA.
Four of the five stated that the reasons they were unable to
enter into any agreements in the past are the same reasons
they do not have a current agreement: contract type—all
FFP (two) , frequent rate changes (one) and reluctance on the
part of the contractor (one) . The respondent surveyed at
the other PRO stated that "a poor Government/contractor
business relationship" was the reason for the command's
inability to negotiate any prior agreements. The respondent
indicated that although the business relationship has
improved, the pending sale of the company is the reason that
there is no current FPRA.
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4 . Question Three
Question Three was, "What do you feel are the main
advantages of FPRA's?"
The main advantage of FPRA's cited most freguently
by the respondents was that the agreements "facilitate the
review of contractor proposals by the PCO." Twelve of the
28 activities (43 percent) interviewed listed this as at
least one of the advantages of FPRA's. The second most
popular advantage identified was that FPRA's "simplify
and/or expedite the negotiation process." This advantage
was stated by eight respondents (29 percent) . A third
benefit, mentioned by five commands (18 percent) , was that
FPRA's provide "uniformity and consistency in rates."
A list of other advantages of FPRA's given by those
interviewed follows:
1. The FPRA process provides for a greater depth of
analysis into contractor's actual costs and cost
estimating systems.
2. FPRA's reenforce the "one-face-to-industry" concept of
contract administration.
3. FPRA's provide a benchmark with which to measure the
contractor's performance.
4. FPRA's help contractors budget and provide the
contractor with an incentive to control costs.
5. FPRA's build an atmosphere of cooperation between the
Government and the contractor.
6. FPRA's are less costly than a full review of every
proposal
.




Question Four was, "What do you feel are the main
disadvantages of FPRA's?"
Thirteen of 28 respondents (46 percent) felt that
there were no significant disadvantages if a properly
negotiated FPRA was achieved. The most common disadvantage
cited by six of the respondents (22 percent) was the
possibility of "experienced actual costs getting out of
tolerance with the FPRA rates."
Other disadvantages of FPRA's identified by those
interviewed are as follows:
1. The complexity of the FPRA process makes it difficult
to negotiate the agreement on time.
2. While FPRA's can facilitate a PCO's workload, the
agreements can also "tie-their-hands.
"
3. FPRA's require a vast amount of resources and time to
establish and survey.
4. FPRA's are sometimes established when the rate
structure is not stable enough to support the rates.
5. The complexity of the FPRA process makes it difficult
to quickly establish new rates when rates are
abrogated.
6. Question Five
Question Five was, "What actions can be taken by
DCASPRO'S/NAVPRO'S to increase the number of FPRA's?"
Three actions were cited by more than one of the
activities in answer to this question. The required use of
the "Joint Logistics Commanders' (JLC) rates for executive
compensation, salaries, wages and employee benefits" was
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mentioned by 15 respondents (54 percent) as an obstacle
that, if removed, would lead to an increase in the number of
FPRA's. As discussed in Section II.B.2.C, there are five
PRO'S that have current FPRA's where the agreements do not
cover labor rates. All five stated that the JLC rate
requirement was the primary reason why they were unable to
negotiate an FPRA that included labor rates. Five of 28
commands (18 percent) felt that "the Government needs to do
a better selling job to the contractor." They stated that
the DCASPRO's/NAVPRO's must educate the contractor to the
benefits of FPRA's and emphasize the importance of the
agreements. Three respondents (11 percent) said that
"pressure on the contractors from the buying offices to
enter into FPRA's would motivate some contractors into
negotiating agreements."
In addition to the three actions described above,
other actions that were identified are as follows:
1. Use of unilaterally determined Forward Pricing Rate
Recommendations (FPRR's) to motivate the contractor to
enter into a bilateral FPRA.
2. Development of a better working relationship and
rapport among the three organizations involved in the
FPRA process—the PRO, DCAA and the contractor.
3. Negotiate individual factors. Do not hold out for an
all or nothing agreement.
4
.
Review FPRA proposals with the intent of entering into
an agreement.
5. Use of a Business Management Office concept similar to
the Air Force Plant Representative Offices (AFPRO'S)
where one office is responsible for all aspects of the
FPRA.
6. Require contractors to submit FPRA proposals on a
timely basis.




Question Six was, "What actions can be taken by
government contractors to increase the number of FPRA's?"
It was the general consensus of those interviewed
that "contractors are only going to enter into FPRA's if
they feel that an agreement is in their best interest." For
contractors truly interested in establishing an agreement,
"cooperation," "good communications" and "timely submission
of current, accurate and complete proposals" were the
actions identified as being most beneficial towards
increasing the number of FPRA's. One or a combination of
all three of these actions were mentioned by 12 of the
respondents (43 percent) . Other actions stated are as
follows:




In some cases contractors need to propose a greater
number of factors.
3 In some cases contractors need the interest and
involvement of higher levels of management in the FPRA
process.
8 Question Seven
Question Seven was, "What statutory or regulatory
changes could be made that would lead to an increase in the
number of FPRA's?"
An overwhelming majority of the respondents (19
PRO'S (68 percent)), expressed satisfaction with the current
laws and regulations governing FPRA's and felt that no
statutory or regulatory changes should be made. Although
not specifically a regulation, there was considerable
discussion on the issue of the JLC rates. Those PRO's that
are impacted by the use of these rates found them to be
unrealistic and said the 3.5% should be changed or the
requirement to use the rates abolished. A representative
sample of the comments expressed by DCASPRO/NAVPRO personnel
concerning the JLC uniform rates of change follows:
1. We should do away with the tri-services (JLC) or DRI.
You cannot live with both of them. DCAA uses DRI and
they take into consideration the tri-services. ... If
the audit report uses DRI, and the contractor is aware
of this, how will you ever get to tri-services if it
is lower? I think that they (JLC's) are playing
games.
2. We had a negotiated agreement until October 1986. Then
the company sat down and negotiated with the union and
that negated our FPRA's for obvious reasons—the
factors were no longer valid. We're stuck with 3.5%.
It ' s been a horrendous chore to try and get anything
done with the contractor because of that.
3. The only problem is right now we're stuck with a
mandated 3.5% rate that is an unrealistic rate. I've
talked unofficially to the contractor about the 3.5%.
They are just backing in the hours to come out to the
bottom line in order to get what they feel is a
reasonable rate.
4. The JLC rate is illogical, impractical, and such a
vague guideline that its quite useless because there
are seldom two contractors that are alike.
Other recommended statutory/regulatory changes
1. A change to the regulations that would allow for
unilateral adjustment of the rates based on trend data
accumulated by the cost monitor.
2. Establish a mandatory requirement for PCO's to use
FPRA ' s
.
3. Make a change to the Weighted Guidelines Method of
profit/fee determination to reward contractors for
their use of FPRA's.
C. SUMMARY
The purpose of Chapter III was to provide the results of
the survey that was conducted of the 28 DCASPRO's and
NAVPRO's. The chapter was segmented to address the data of
each survey question separately. An analysis of this data




The first step in the analysis will be to examine the
advantages and disadvantages of FPRA's in order to determine
the usefulness of these agreements as a tool in the
contracting process. The extent to which FPRA's have been
established by DCASPRO's and NAVPRO's should reflect this
usefulness.
The analysis is divided into three sections. Section
one will examine the advantages and disadvantages of FPRA's.
Section two will review current FPRA usage at the DCASPRO's
and NAVPRO's. Section two will also analyze the reasons why
FPRA's are not established and discuss some actions that may
be taken in order to increase the number of agreements.
Proposed statutory/regulatory changes are presented in
section three.
B. ANALYSIS
1 . Advantages and Disadvantages of Forward Pricing Rate
Agreements
a. Advantages
A PCO who does not have forward pricing rate
agreements or recommended rates available for use must
attempt to negotiate contracts from positions based
primarily on DCAA audited rates. Without an FPRA or FPRR it
is difficult for the PCO to determine a fair and reasonable
price, particularly if he/she is getting adverse opinions
from the auditor. Conversely, the contractor is at an
advantage in this situation because the PCO has neither the
time nor the resources to digest the contractor's entire
accounting system and examine all the details of every rate.
It is hard for the PCO to identify what problems are present
in the contractor's overheads.
However, when an FPRA is in place, the majority
of a PCO's contract proposal analysis has already been
accomplished. The PCO receives the primary benefits of the
time and effort that have already been expended by DCAA and
the Contract Administration Office (CAO) in establishing the
forward pricing rate agreement. The PCO is able to
substantially reduce his/her own workload by using FPRA's in
cost analysis. The PCO has rates available that have been
reviewed by both DCAA and the CAO and have been determined
to be fair and reasonable by both the contractor and the
Government. All the PCO must do in the proposal evaluation
is validate the quantities and kinds of labor and material.
Once the validation is complete the PCO can use the FPRA as
a price schedule and price out the contract.
The Government also gains an in-depth knowledge
and understanding of the contractor's accounting and cost
estimating systems through establishment of an agreement.
The FPRA proposal review equates to a mini should cost (if
the review was not done in conjunction with an actual should
cost) . Should cost techniques are used to evaluate overhead
rates and every element of the pools is examined. This FPRA
proposal review is a very time consuming, labor intensive
process but it pays off through the knowledge that is gained
of the contractor's business practices.
FPRA's are also useful to the contractor. The
agreements simplify preparation of contract proposals. They
can be used as a management tool to control costs.
Management can give the negotiated rates to the program
managers and/or department heads and say "Here are the
negotiated rates that you need to meet." The FPRA rates
thus become goals for the middle managers to achieve,
b. Disadvantages
The disadvantage of FPRA's mentioned most
frequently by the respondents was the possibility of
"experienced actual costs getting out of tolerance with the
FPRA rates." When this circumstance occurs and the FPRA
rates are not modified or abrogated, one of the parties to
the agreement could suffer.
On a Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract, the
contractor assumes all of the contract cost risk. If actual
costs get out of tolerance with the FPRA rates on which the
FFP contract was based, the contractor will either gain or
lose money. This is an inherent risk with an FFP contract
whether the contract is established using rates negotiated
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separately or using an FPRA. If the contractor is
overrunning the rates the contractor is losing money. If
the rates are being underrun the contractor will be making
additional profits. Due to the nature of an FFP contract,
when a proposal is priced using FPRA rates, the PCO must
ensure that the FPRA is still current and accurately
reflects the contractor's rates before entering into this
type of contract.
If actual costs and FPRA rates get out of
tolerance on cost type or flexibly priced contracts, there
is less of a potential monetary gain or loss providing that
provisional billing rates are properly adjusted. However,
if the billing rates are not being properly maintained,
overrunning cost type or flexible priced contracts could
cause a contractor serious cash flow problems. A contractor
that underruns will be gaining interest free use of the
Government's money until the time when the final rates are
determined.
The negotiation of FPRA's must not be viewed as
a win or lose contest. The focus should be on obtaining
rates that are fair and reasonable to both sides. The
execution of an agreement with rates that are lower than
estimated appears appealing to the Government. However, an
agreement of this type would actually be a disadvantage.
When billing rates are determined or the final rates are
established "a few years down the road," the PCO's who have
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entered into cost type or flexibly priced contracts using
FPRA rates that are too low may be required to find
additional funding to cover the differences between the FPRA
rates and the billing or final rates.
The CAO must use good business judgement in
establishing an FPRA. An FPRA should not be executed for
the sole purpose of having a rate agreement. If there is
instability in the contractor's rate structure, it is not in
the Government ' s best interest to commit the time and
resources required for an FPRA because there is no guarantee
or assurance that the rates are going to stand for a
reasonable period of time. It would be disadvantageous to
enter into an FPRA under these conditions,
c. Summary
Based on both research and the interviews
conducted with the survey respondents, it is apparent that
in most cases the advantages of FPRA's heavily outweigh the
disadvantages. This is supported by the fact that 46
percent of the respondents could not identify any
disadvantages of a properly negotiated agreement. An
exception to this is when there is instability in the
contractor's rate structure. As was discussed above, there
is much to be gained by establishing an FPRA. An agreement
both facilitates the performance of a contracting officer's
workload and provides the Government with an in-depth
knowledge of the contractor's accounting and cost estimating
systems. This more than offsets the small possibility of
establishing rates that do not reflect actual costs. (Even
if improper rates are established, they are easily
abrogated.) Therefore, it becomes obvious that FPRA's are
beneficial.
There is a very high level of satisfaction
concerning FPRA's among those activities with current
agreements. Additionally, the majority of commands without
FPRA's expressed a desire to have them. Since a comparison
of FPRA advantages to disadvantages shows that the
agreements are beneficial in most circumstances, the
guestion arises: "Have FPRA's been established to the
maximum extent possible?" The next section will examine
FPRA usage at the DCASPRO's and NAVPRO's.
2 . Forward Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA) Usage
The primary research guestion of this thesis
concerns the extent to which FPRA's have been established at
DCASPRO's and NAVPRO's. A recapitulation of the data shows
that approximately one-half (54 percent) of the commands
surveyed currently have agreements of some type while only
about one-third (36 percent) have agreements covering the
major categories of labor and overhead. These percentages
could rise to 64 percent and 50 percent, respectively,
depending on the outcome of FPRA proposals that are
presently under review.
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As discussed in the previous section, the advantages
of FPRA's vastly outweigh the disadvantages. Thus, it is
the researcher's opinion that the percentage of activities
with agreements is too low for a contracting tool as
beneficial as an FPRA. This is particularly true for the
number of commands with FPRA's covering both labor and
overhead rates. In the most optimistic outcome only 50
percent of the activities would possess agreements covering
these two categories.
In an effort to determine why these percentages are
low, the following paragraphs contain an analysis of some of
the reasons why PRO'S do not have FPRA's of any type or have
agreements that are limited in scope. Reasons one through
five are the main reasons why FPRA's are not established.
The data in Chapter III show that no one of the five are
predominant but rather all five have virtually the same
impact. Reason six is the primary reason why PRO'S are
unable to enter into FPRA's that cover labor rates.
a. Reason One—Structural reorganization or sale of
the Company
This was the most common reason given for the
inability of those activities surveyed to establish an FPRA.
Sale and/or reorganization of a company tends to affect each
division's strategic and financial plans. Budgets are
normally changed and contracts are occasionally shifted
between divisions. Manufacturing overhead and G&A bases are
frequently affected. During these periods of change there
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is reluctance on the part of both the contractor and the
Government to enter into any type of forward pricing rate
agreement.
It is advisable for both parties to avoid an
FPRA during a period of reorganization or sale of the
company. Either of these circumstances can lead to
instability in the contractor's rates. When there is
instability in the rates an FPRA is no longer useful. The
Government has no control over the sale or reorganization of
a company but it is incumbent upon the CAO to attempt to
establish new agreements once the sale or reorganization of
the company is complete.
b. Reason Two—Contract Type
Two contractors did not desire to enter into
FPRA's because they bid rates competitively and bid only on
Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contracts. It is the researcher's
opinion that the contractors' decision is justified. One of
the characteristics of FFP contracts is that contractors
assume all cost risk. If the contractors bid only on
Invitations For Bid (IFB) under the sealed bid method of
contracting it is not in their best interests to have
established forward pricing rates.
c. Reason Three—Frequent Rate Changes
A contractor who bids on a high volume of
contracts in a competitive marketplace is subject to a
frequently changing business base. Overhead rates may
fluctuate significantly depending on how successful the
contractor is in obtaining new work. Frequently changing
business conditions can cause a contractor's rates to change
periodically throughout the year. In this case, an FPRA is
not cost effective because the time, effort and costs
required to initially attain the agreement are wasted if the
agreement is abrogated shortly after execution. Frequent
updating and continual negotiations would be required to
maintain an FPRA. Therefore, it can be concluded that when
a contractor's rates change frequently throughout the year,
an FPRA is not desirable.
d. Reason Four—Inadequate Accounting System
and/or Inadequate Cost Estimating System
Contractors with inadequate accounting systems
and/or inadequate cost estimating systems are lacking the
fundamentals required to establish an FPRA. If the cost
estimating systems are inadequate, it is not possible for
the contractor to submit a proposal that can be determined
to be fair and reasonable by the ACO. Additionally, if the
contractor's accounting system is inadequate, an FPRA could
not be monitored because variance analyses could not
properly be performed.
Pressure must be put on those contractors with
inadequate accounting and/or cost estimating systems to
improve these systems. This issue transcends FPRA's. It is
important for any contractor that does a significant volume
of Government business to have adequate accounting and cost
estimating systems.
e. Reason Five—Contractor is Reluctant to Enter
into an FPRA
There are certain instances where the contractor
just simply does not desire to have an FPRA. One reason is
the contractor's lack of knowledge of the advantages of this
type of agreement. Some contractors also feel that the Bid
and Proposal (B&P) costs required to establish an FPRA are
too large an investment in an agreement that has the
possibility of being canceled before it expires.
Contractors who are reluctant or lack interest
can only be convinced to enter into FPRA's through proper
selling of the agreements. Contractors need to be persuaded
that some up-front work can pay off in the long run through
reduced proposal preparation effort and simpler
negotiations. However, convincing a contractor of the
benefits of FPRA's is not the sole responsibility of the
CAO. Pressure to establish an FPRA must be put on the
contractor by the actual customers, the PCO's.
In order for the Government "to sell" FPRA's,
contractors must be willing to establish FPRA's. DCASPRO's/
NAVPRO's need to review FPRA proposals with the objective of
reaching an agreement. The contractor's top management must
understand that it is the Government's desire to come to an
agreement. A contractor who feels that the DCASPRO/NAVPRO
is attempting to establish an agreement that is fair and
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reasonable, vice one-sided or punitive, will be more
receptive to the idea of an FPRA. The PRO'S and their
cognizant contractors must maintain a cooperative business
atmosphere.
Maintaining a cooperative relationship also
requires the contractor to submit timely FPRA proposals.
The proposals must be current, accurate and complete and the
contractor must also have accounting and cost estimating
systems that are capable of supporting the proposal. If the
proposals are not current, accurate and complete, or the
contractor cannot support them, the Government will waste
time and effort reviewing the proposal. The cooperative
business atmosphere will then deteriorate. The same holds
true if the Government does not attempt to negotiate a fair
and reasonable agreement. The contractor will begin to
distrust the Government and it will be impossible to reach
any type of agreement.
A program to reward contractors that establish
FPRA's is another action that could overcome the reluctance
of a contractor to enter into these agreements. Although
some contractors do not view FPRA's as equitable, a reward
such as increased profit or fee, or less Government
oversight might provide the proper incentive for a
previously reticent contractor to execute an FPRA.
One way to reward contractors who establish
FPRA's is a change to the Weighted Guidelines Method of
profit/ fee determination. This could be accomplished by
adding another section to the Weighted Guidelines that would
allow for an additional percentage of profit/fee, (e.g., one
percent) if FPRA rates are used in proposal evaluation.
Another way to reward contractors would be to permit
profit/ fee on Bid and Proposal (B&P) costs that were
incurred on FPRA's. However, it would be very difficult to
properly apportion this allowance over the contractor's
various contracts.
The researcher feels that both of these proposed
reward systems have merit. Additional profit can be a
strong motivator for some contractors, but less Government
oversight may be all that is needed for a contractor to
establish an agreement. Contractors are very dissatisfied
with the amount of Government audit and review that they are
subject to. Any action that would lessen this burden would
be desirable to most contractors and thus be considered a
reward.
On the other hand, some contractors may be
reluctant to enter into an agreement regardless of the
reward. The FPRA review process permits the Government to
gain an in-depth knowledge of the contractors' records and
business practices. These contractors do not want the
Government to have this level of understanding of how they
conduct their business.
f. Reason Six—The JLC Uniform Rates of Change for
Executive Compensation, Salaries, Wages and
Employee Benefits
It is difficult to expect that one escalation
rate, such as the JLC rate, can be established that is
appropriate for all contractors. Geographical location,
nature of business, size of business, and type and size of
contracts are some of the factors that affect a contractor's
work force and labor rates. Some contractors have a blend
of very sophisticated personnel (e.g., engineers,
scientists, systems analysts) while other contractors use
predominantly blue collar workers. Data Resources, Inc.
(DRI) indices reflect these various factors but the JLC
rates of change do not. Even DCAA used DRI factors when
computing costs.
During discussions with both DCASPRO and NAVPRO
personnel the researcher gained the impression that,
depending upon the PRO'S customers, it is much easier for a
DCASPRO to establish an FPRA covering labor rates than it is
for a NAVPRO. This is because the Navy seems intent on
making the JLC rates a cap while the Air Force and Army are
willing to accept a higher rate if properly justified.
Therefore, the NAVPRO 's find it impossible to justify a
higher rate while a DCASPRO, depending on who is its primary
customer (Air Force, Navy or Army) , can more easily justify
a rate higher than JLC and establish an FPRA. Both the Navy
and DLA have directed that JLC rates be used by the PRO's
for labor escalation unless a higher rate is justified
(Section II.H.l). DCASPRO's that have the backing of their
buying commands, normally the Air Force and ARMY, have been
more successful in justifying labor rate increases higher
than JLC and establishing FPRA's covering labor. Although
buying command approval is not required to execute an FPRA,
it is a waste of effort to establish agreements that will
not be used by the PCO's. This is why the NAVPRO's and
DCASPRO ' s that have the Navy as primary customers have not
been very successful in establishing FPRA's that cover labor
rates.
There are two other reasons why the DCASPRO's
and NAVPRO's are able to establish FPRA's for labor without
exceeding the JLC 3.5 percent rate. These two occur when a
contractor uses either (1) union agreements which call for a
less than 3.5% rate of change or (2) a merit (bonus) pay
system. Merit pay is a system where employees are paid lump
sum bonuses above their base salary. The base salary
remains constant from year to year and thus does not reflect
an annual escalation. Merit pay is very controversial;
however, the overall net effect over several years is
normally less than a 3.5 percent annual escalation because
there is no annual compounding of the escalation.
There is currently a decline in the usage of
FPRA's at the DCASPRO's and NAVPRO's. This decline appears
to be due more to the existence of factors that make FPRA's
difficult to establish rather than dissatisfaction with the
agreements. Structural reorganization or sale of the
company; inadequate accounting system and/or cost estimating
system; and reluctance/lack of interest on the part of the
contractor are the main reasons for the decline. Each of
these reasons was previously discussed.
3 . Laws and Regulations Governing Forward Pricing Rate
Agreements
As stated in Chapter III, the majority of the
respondents felt that the current laws and regulations
governing FPRA's are satisfactory and should not be changed.
The researcher agrees with this position. The fact that an
FPRA is a voluntary agreement as opposed to a requirement is
one of its main selling points. Since neither the
Government nor industry are obligated to establish FPRA's,
they will negotiate agreements only when it is in their best
interests. Therefore, an FPRA is an agreement between the
Government and a contractor that represents the best
interests of both parties. Although the current laws and
regulations are satisfactory, the following proposed changes
may enhance FPRA's.
One possible change to the regulations is a
requirement for PCO's to use FPRA's once they have been
established. If PCO's do not use the agreements but attempt
to negotiate rates on each new contract proposal they are
undermining the whole purpose of FPRA's. A PCO's non-use of
an effective agreement gives the contractor an impression
67
that the time and effort spent by the contractor in
establishing the FPRA was wasted. It will probably make the
contractor reluctant to enter into rate agreements in the
future. If an FPRA is no longer current, the ACO must
modify the rates or abrogate the agreement. However, if the
FPRA is current, PCO's should be required to use the agreed
to rates in contract proposal evaluations.
Another recommended change to the regulations is an
allowance for unilateral adjustment of the rates based on
trend data accumulated by a cost monitor. Currently it is
standard procedure to wait until the rates get out of
tolerance and then either modify the agreement or abrogate
and attempt to establish a new agreement. Both of these
options are labor intensive because new proposals must be
submitted and reviewed and negotiations must take place.
Monthly or quarterly unilateral adjustment of the rates
based on trend data will ensure that the rates remain
current with a minimal expenditure of time and effort. The
contractor still has the option to abrogate the agreement if
the unilateral change is not deemed to be fair and
reasonable. Although this process is more practical for
billing rates than for FPRA's, if forward pricing rates are
frequently adjusted based on trend data, it might be
possible to reduce the number of agreements that are
abrogated.
C. SUMMARY
A review of the advantages and disadvantages of FPRA's
showed that these agreements, when properly negotiated, are
an effective contracting tool. An examination of their
usage revealed that FPRA's have not been established to the
maximum extent possible at DCASPRO's and NAVPRO's. The
reasons for non-use and proposed solutions were discussed in
this chapter. Some proposed statutory/regulatory changes
that might improve the agreements were also examined. The
final chapter of this thesis will address the researcher's
conclusions and recommendations concerning FPRA's. Chapter
V will answer the research guestions and suggest topics for
further research.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Data presented in this thesis were derived from an
examination of Forward Pricing Rate Agreements at NAVPRO's
and DCASPRO's. This final chapter will state the
researcher's conclusions as derived from analysis of these
data. The chapter will also include recommendations for
improving the FPRA process, answer the research questions,
and list areas of possible future research on this topic.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. Forward Pricing Rate Agreements Covering the Main
Categories of Labor and Overhead Rates Have not
Been Established to the Maximum Extent Possible
at DCASPRO's and NAVPRO's
Only 36 percent (10 of 28) of the activities queried
have agreements that cover the major rates of labor and
overhead. Of these 10 PRO's, only nine have agreements
which also cover other factors.
There are five commands that are presently reviewing
FPRA proposals. Four of the five commands are optimistic
that they will be able to negotiate agreements which cover
both labor and overhead rates. However, even if all four
PRO's are successful, the percentage of DCASPRO's and
NAVPRO's that have FPRA's covering the major categories of
labor and overhead would only rise to 50 percent.
2.
The Joint Logistics Commanders' (JLC) Uniform Rates
of Change are Currently the Primary Obstacles
Preventing an Increase in the Number of FPRA's
Which Cover Labor Rates
All five activities that possess current FPRA's
which do not cover labor rates cited the JLC uniform rates
of change for executive compensation, salaries, wages and
employee benefits as the reason why they were not able to
include labor rates in their agreements. Fifty-four percent
of the respondents mentioned the JLC rates as an obstacle
that, if removed, would lead to an increase in the number of
FPRA ' s
.
3 The Laws and Regulations Governing FPRA's are
Satisfactory and do not Currently Require Any
Changes
The survey data showed that, overall, there is
general satisfaction with the laws and regulations governing
FPRA's. Sixty-eight percent of the respondents felt that no
statutory or regulatory change should be made concerning
these agreements. The researcher agrees with that opinion.
4 The Overrunning or Underrunning of the Agreement
Rates are the Primary Reasons FPRA's are Abrogated
(Canceled)
Eighty-eight percent (14 of 16) of the commands that
have abrogated a previous FPRA stated that overrunning or
underrunning of the rates was the primary reason. When
changes in a contractor's business conditions cause the
rates to get out of tolerance, the contractor will,
depending on the direction the rate changes, begin
overrunning or underrunning the rates. When this occurs, an
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FPRA is no longer an effective means for pricing contracts
and thus it is proper to abrogate the agreement. This is
the reason FPRA rates are monitored on a continual basis.
5. There is Presently a Decline in the Establishment of
FPRA's at DCASPRO's and NAVPRO '
s
Although forty-six (13 of 28) of the commands
surveyed currently do not have FPRA's of any type, only 18
percent have not had any agreements in the past five years.
As was previously stated in Chapter IV, the decline appears
to be due more to the external imposition of factors that
make FPRA's difficult to establish rather than dissatisfac-
tion with this type of agreement.
6. In Most Cases, the Advantages to the Government of
FPRA's Heavily Outweigh the Disadvantages of the
Agreements
For the Government, there is much to be gained and
little to be lost in establishing an FPRA. Forty-six
percent of the survey respondents could not identify any
disadvantages of a properly negotiated FPRA. The agreement
both facilitates the performance of a contracting officer's
workload and provides the Government with an in-depth
knowledge of a contractor's accounting and cost estimating
systems. The main exception to this conclusion is when
there is instability in the contractor's rate structure.
7. FPRA's that are Current and in Effect are not Always
Utilized bv Procurement Contracting Officers (PCO's)
for Contract Proposal Evaluations
FAR states that: "Contracting Officers will use
FPRA rates as bases for pricing all contracts, modifications
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and other contractual actions...." [Ref. l:p. 15-39]
However, it was the experience of the majority of the survey
respondents that the rates are normally, but not always,
used by PCO's. There are two primary reasons for non-use of
the agreement rates. Either the PCO's are not aware that an
FPRA exists or the PCO's feel that they can negotiate rates
that are better than the agreement rates.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Eliminate the Requirement to use the JLC Uniform
Rates of Change When Determining Forward Pricing
Rates for Executive Compensation, Salaries, Wages
and Employee Benefits
During the course of the survey it became evident
that there was a strong dissatisfaction among the
respondents regarding the requirement to use the JLC uniform
rates of change. It also became evident that the required
use of these rates was the main reason why FPRA's covering
all factors could not be established.
Most contractors view the JLC rates as unrealistic.
However, most contractors are willing to use Data Resources,
Inc. (DRI) , indices for forecasting labor escalation. DCAA
also recommends using DRI rates. A replacement of the
requirement to use JLC rates with the requirement to use DRI
rates would result in an increase in the number of FPRA's
which cover labor rates.
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2.
Establish Some Type of Reward System for Contractors
Who Enter into FPRA's
Some contractors do not view FPRA's as equitable and
thus do not desire to enter into this type of agreement.
The contractor's feelings are justified. On the whole,
FPRA's are more beneficial for the Government than they are
for contractors. Although the proposal process is
simplified for both parties, the Government derives an added
advantage by obtaining greater visibility into how the
contractors conduct their business. Therefore, a reward to
contractors who execute FPRA's such as less Government
oversight or increased profit or fee would balance this
inequality and provide reticent contractors with an
incentive to negotiate FPRA's.
3 Both Plant Representative Office and Buying Command
Personnel Must Take an Active Role in the FPRA
Process and Sell These Agreements to Those
Contractors Who are Reluctant to Establish Them
Contractors who are reluctant to establish or lack
interest concerning FPRA's can only be convinced to enter
into FPRA's through proper selling of the agreements.
DCASPRO/NAVPRO personnel must assume an active role in this
selling process and persuade contractors that some up-front
work can pay off in the long run through reduced proposal
preparation effort and simpler negotiations. The actual
customers, the buying commands, must also become active in
the selling process by putting pressure on contractors to
establish agreements.
4 . Establish a Mandatory Requirement for Procurement
Contracting Officers (PCO's) to Use FPRA's in
Contract Proposal Evaluations
When PCO's do not use FPRA's, but attempt to
negotiate rates on each new contract proposal, they are
undermining the whole purpose of FPRA's. A PCO's non-use of
an effective agreement gives the contractor an impression
that the time and effort spent by the contractor in
establishing the FPRA was wasted. It will probably make the
contractor reluctant to enter into rate agreements in the
future
.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1 . Primary Research Question: To What Extent have
Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRA's) been
Established at DCASPRO's and NAVPRO's ?
As shown in Section II.B.2.C, 54 percent of the
activities gueried currently have FPRA's of some type. Only
3 6 percent have agreements that cover the major rates of
labor and overhead. Of this 3 6 percent, 9 percent have
agreements that also cover other factors. Forty six percent
of the activities currently do not have FPRA's of any type.
Eighteen percent of the commands are presently
reviewing FPRA proposals to either establish new agreements
or increase the coverage of current agreements. Eighty
percent of these commands are optimistic that they will be
able to negotiate an agreement. If the 80 percent are
indeed successful, the combined number of DCASPRO's and
NAVPRO's surveyed that possess FPRA's would rise from 54 to
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65 percent. However, commands with agreements covering the
major categories of labor and overhead would only rise from
36 to 50 percent.
Although data were gathered from only about one-half
of the DCASPRO's and NAVPRO's it is assumed that the
percentages presented above accurately reflect the entire
population.
2 . What are the Reasons (Government and Contractor)
.
That FPRA's are not Established?
There are five main reasons why FPRA's are not
established and one reason why the Government is unable to
enter into agreements that cover labor rates. These six
reasons are:
1. There is instability in the rates due to a structural
reorganization and/or sale of the company.
2
.
The contractor bids rates competitively and bids only
on Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contracts.
3. Frequent rate changes—The contractor's periodic rate
changes throughout the year cause FPRA's to not be
cost effective.
4. The contractor's accounting and/or cost estimating
systems are inadequate to support an agreement.
5. The contractor is reluctant to enter into an FPRA.
6. The required use of the Joint Logistics Commander's
(JLC) uniform rates of change for executive
compensation, salaries, wages and employee benefits is
the reason why PRO'S have been unable to establish
FPRA's covering labor rates.
3.
To What Extent and for What Reasons are FPRA's
Abrogated (Canceled) by Either Party Prior to the
Expiration of the Agreement ?
As was shown in Chapter III, 82 percent of the
activities surveyed have had at least one FPRA during the
past five years. Of these activities, 7 percent have had
at least one agreement abrogated.
The overwhelming reason why FPRA's are canceled is
the overrunning or underrunning of the agreement rates.
Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) issues and the development
of a poor business relationship between the contractor and
the Government are two other reasons.
4 What Actions can be Taken (Government. Contractor
and Statutory/regulatory) to Increase the Number
of FPRA's ?
The primary actions the Government can take to
increase the number of FPRA's are: (1) abolish the
requirement to use the JLC uniform rates of change for labor
rates, (2) do a better job of selling FPRA's to contractors
and (3) have the buying offices put pressure on contractors
to enter into FPRA's. Cooperation, good communications and
timely submission of current, accurate and complete
proposals are three actions required of contractors to
increase the number of agreements. The laws and regulations
currently governing FPRA's are satisfactory and no statutory
or regulatory changes are required.
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E. TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Compare and contrast the method utilized by the Joint
Logistics Commanders (JLC) to establish labor
escalation rates against the method used by Data
Resources, Inc. (DRI) . Examine the proposed rates
against actual labor escalations experienced to
determine which method is more accurate.
2. AFPRO's have established a Business Management Office
responsible for all aspects of FPRA's. Compare and
contrast this concept with the way in which FPRA's are
presently administered at DCASPRO's and NAVPRO's.
3. Examine the use of FPRA's at Defense Contract
Administration Services, Management Areas (DCASMA)
.
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